There are often said to be five main 'theories of truth': correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, and semantic theories. The coherence theory of truth equates the truth of a judgment with its coherence with other beliefs. Different versions of the theory give different accounts of coherence, but in all its forms the point is to exhibit truth as an internal relation between beliefs. The pragmatic theory of truth is akin to a coherence theory of this Kantian kind. No coherence theorist need (...) deny the uncontentious claim that for a judgment to be true is for it to stand in a certain relationship, which can be called correspondence, with some state of affairs in the world. The conflict with the redundancy theory may be more apparent than real. For the redundancy theory is not a theory of what truth consists in, but a theory about the meaning of the words 'is true'. (shrink)

It has long been disputed whether Kant's transcendental idealism requires two worlds ? one of appearances and one of things in themselves ? or only one. The one-world view must be wrong if it claims that individual spatio-temporal things can be identified with particular things in themselves, and if it fails to take seriously the doctrine of double affection; versions that insist on one world, without making claims about the identity of individual things, cannot say in what way the world (...) as we know it and the world of things in themselves can be ?the same?. The two-world view must be wrong if it denies Kant's empirical realism, or offers a phenomenalist interpretation of it. On moral grounds Kant ?identifies? each human person with a particular thing in itself, but the relationship here cannot be strict identity; instead its closeness may warrant regarding the two distinct entities as part of a composite whole. Perhaps up to the first edition of the Critique, Kant thought that empirical knowledge required a particular kind of close correspondence between appearances and things in themselves, one that would make it appropriate to speak of composite wholes here also. By the time of the second edition, he saw that there could be no good grounds for thinking that. In this respect something a bit like the one-world theory might make more sense for the first edition than for the second; but in both cases there is room to speak of two worlds as well. Talk of the number of worlds is metaphorical, and both metaphors have their dangers. (shrink)

The four sections of the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 1 are each introduced by a new definition of matter. For the Phoronomy it is defined as the movable in space (Ak. IV, 480); the other defini­tions presuppose this one. What is the status of the propositions ascribing existence to matter in these senses? Are the metaphysical principles of natural science as pure as the principles of pure understanding, or are they only required for experience which happens, in fact, to contain (...) matter as defined at the beginnings of the sections? (shrink)

Kant held the moral law to be an objective imperative, an entity in its own right. It carries with it prescriptive force, in parallel to other principles of pure reason, like those of logic and mathematics. Objective imperatives therefore do not derive their authority from any other source,such as common consensus or the will of God. In Objective Imperatives, Ralph C. S. Walker seeks to show that this is a highly defensible view: Kant's Categorical Imperative, properly understood, is (...) broadly right. The key to it is rationality, and not universality, which functions only as anapproximate test. Often, Kant sets the matter out badly, and most of the common objections to him can be shown to be due to misunderstandings. A morality that gives us an objective imperative does appear incompatible with the determinism to which Kant commits himself, but Walker argues that thisappearance is misleading. (shrink)

Spells out the power and renewed relevance of Kant's thinking: a genuinely objective, absolute basis for a modern moral law.

'Dry,obscure...Prolix.' That was Kant's own critique of his first Critique - and exasperated students since having it extended to the rest of his work. Yet despite it's sprawling for and forbidding content, Kant's moral philosophy has continued to compel the attention of every serious thinker in the field. Clear, Concise - and overwhelmingly convinvcing - Ralph Walker's brilliant guide spells out the power and renewed relevance of histhinking : a genuinely objective, absolute basis for a modern moral law.

This book gives a general introduction to the philosophy of Kant, and especially to "The Critique of Pure Reason." The author is cognizant of recent German research on Kant, and it informs his analysis of Kant's interpretation of the moral law and of the arguments for the existence of God. The special role of the argument from design is considered in detail, and the argument is advanced that Kant's transcendental idealism is "a very appealing theory." Readers should come away from (...) this book with an understanding of the transcendental philosophy that underlies much of modern theology. (shrink)

The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Vol. I, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755?1770. Ed. and tr. by D. Walford in collaboration with R. Meerbote, Cambridge University Press, 1992. lxxxi + 543 pp. £50.00 The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Vol. DC, Lectures on Logic. Ed. and tr. by J. Michael Young, Cambridge University Press, 1992. xxxii + 695 pp. £50.00 The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment by John H. Zammito, University of Chicago Press, 1992.490 pp. (...) £51.95 hb; £15.25 pb. (shrink)

In a comment on my paper, "Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics" (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confrontational rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.

The theoretical framework laid out by Findlay & Walker has direct implications for central topics in research on saccades in reading and other cognitive activities and these in turn may also have implications to be considered in the context of Findlay & Walker's model. The present commentary focuses on the problem of selecting a target for a saccade. It is argued that there are indirect and direct top-down influences on this process and that direct influences are not adequately (...) represented in Findlay & Walker's theory. (shrink)